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Developing countriesThis paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufﬁcient to control global warming, unless
developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. The paper
investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries'
mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering
economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by
following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment
behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation
ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in
determining the ﬁnancial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the
participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable
trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction
obligations in 2030.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
With the upcoming Copenhagen conference in December 2009,
international negotiations over a post-Kyoto treaty are entering a
crucial phase. Notwithstanding the consequences of the current
economic downturn, there are still high expectations about the
possibility of reaching a comprehensive global agreement consistent
with the objective of mitigating the consequences of global warming.
To be environmentally effective, a climate agreement will need to
provide the foundations for overcoming the asymmetric interests and
the free-riding incentives that have thus far prevented meaningful
coordination of global climate change control.
The new US administration's change of position has removed a
long-standing obstacle, so that, despite the remaining differences,
concerted climate mitigation action from the major developedarried out by the Sustainable
Mattei, and was written as a
cial support from the TOCSIN
r applies.
nstitute, Princeton University,
.
l rights reserved.countries now seems more probable than ever before. This is an
important step forward, since many developing countries have made
it clear that their commitment rests on wealthier and more polluting
nations' taking action ﬁrst.
The current upturn in public expenditure which counteracts the
current ﬁnancial and economic turmoil also indicates that govern-
ments are focusing on a somewhat “green” recovery, since a sizeable
slice (roughly 15%) of global ﬁscal stimulus plans has been allocated to
low-carbon measures. The US has devoted 112 billion USD for green
stimulus. Interestingly, China has allocated twice as many resources
(221 billion USD), though mostly in rail and grid infrastructures
(Robins et al., 2009).
Although ﬁrst steps like these are a necessary condition for
effective action against climate change, they are not sufﬁcient and
further steps are needed. The principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities emphasizes the different
roles that Annex 1 (A1) and non-Annex 1 (NA1) countries will play in
an international climate agreement. With no consideration for past
responsibilities, average per capita emissions in the developing world
are still substantially lower than in OECD countries.
However, given the larger and faster growing populations in NA1
regions, the contribution of emerging economies to total emissions
S145V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S144–S151is becoming substantial. China, in particular, has doubled its emis-
sions since the signature of the Kyoto protocol in 1997, and is now
the largest contributor of energy-related CO2 emissions. Today, an
average Chinese citizen's emissions are ¼ those of an average US
one. However, assuming continued economic growth – even if it is
slower than in the past – and given China's population size, a large
number of Chinese citizens may soon reach developed countries'
emission levels. For example, according to Chakravarty et al. (2009),
in 2030 China may have roughly 100 and 300 million people
emitting today's US (20 tCO2) and EU (10 tCO2) per capita averages,
respectively.
The spikes in fossil fuel prices in recent years are a consequence of
fast-growing countries' increasing contribution to global energy
demand. Oil price shocks can harm economic growth prospects for
emerging economies with low levels of per capita energy consump-
tion, but with large manufacturing, energy-intensive industries (Li,
2008). This has led many developing countries to pursue policies
aimed at increasing energy efﬁciency,1 and has shown that well
designed energy policies have the potential to lead to no-regret
investment options.
Focusing on the climate problem, it is now clear that developing
countries, especially fast-growing regions such as those in the so-
called BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), will have a major impact
on future emission dynamics and will play a major role in climate
negotiations. Results from the WITCH model baseline (see Bosetti
et al., 2009) show that even if the OECD regions committed to zero
emissions, the attainment of effective climate stabilization objectives
would soon be impossible if the rest of the world, especially the BRIC,
regions behaved as in the baseline. Non-OECD countries' baseline
emissions would exceed the carbon budget allowed for stabilizing
radiative forcing between 3.5 and 3.7 W/m2 (corresponding to
550 ppm CO2 equivalent), between 2030 and 2040; Baseline emis-
sions of BRICs alone would exceed it between 2035 and 2045.
This highlights the need to engage developing countries –
especially BRICs and foremost China – in GHG mitigation before
2030. The negotiating position of some developing countries has
indeed been changing, but incentives will likely be necessary to
induce them to join a climate coalition (Victor, 2008). Brazil could
apply credit for reducing emissions from deforestation (REDD), whose
priority as a mitigation option has been undisputed since the
conference of parties in Bali in 2007. China might take on environ-
mental commitments partly in return for stronger guarantees of
access to export markets abroad, thus linking trade and environ-
mental policies (Tian and Whalley, 2008). Additional instruments
such as funding for technology adoption and adaptation might also be
used as accession deals.
Within this complicated and uncertain policy framework, devel-
oping countries will need to make important investment decisions in
the next few decades, especially in long-lasting infrastructures that
will shape the way energy will be consumed. This paper aims at
analyzing the implications of different developing countries' decisions
to participate in international climate agreements, with a special focus
on investment decisions in fast-growing emerging markets.
Using the energy–economy–climate model WITCH (Bosetti et al.,
2006), we assess the role of immediate versus delayed participation of
developing regions in an international climate agreement. We
quantify the implications of fragmented participation in terms of
macro-economic policy costs and we investigate the role of technol-
ogy innovation, adoption and diffusion in smoothing the transition of
developing regions to a low-carbon intensive path. In particular, we
look at optimal investment strategies in emerging economies in terms
of energy capital and knowledge when different assumptions are1 China, for example, has set ambitious targets to decrease its energy intensity,
though it has struggled to comply with the 20% reduction goal for 2010. The current
economic recession may make it easier to attain.made about the foresight of their own eventual commitment. We
investigate the recent and projected investment trends in innovation
and low-carbon technologies in China and compare them to the ones
prescribed by a foresight strategy. Finally, we investigate the role of an
international carbon market as a way to provide economic incentives
for participation. We show that the role of policy anticipation should
be taken into account in negotiating emission allocations and has
important implications for the international ﬁnancial transfers
involved.
This work is meant to extend our knowledge about regional
incentives to adopt effective mitigation policies. It extends the
standard climate stabilization economic analysis (see IPCC 4ar
WGIII) by analyzing departures from the ﬁrst-best case of immediate
participation and by looking at the incentives and strategies of
developing regions. A few recent papers (Bosetti et al., 2008;
Edmonds et al., 2007; Keppo and Rao, 2007) – along with those
appearing in this volume (Clarke et al., forthcoming) – analyze the
role of delayed participation of developing countries in international
agreements.
Inter-temporal ﬂexibility is known to be important for the
economic efﬁciency of climate policies and has been analyzed
extensively after Wigley et al. (1996). Models featuring perfect
foresight, such as DICE (Nordhaus, 1992), FUND (Tol, 1999), MERGE
(Manne and Richels, 2004), and WITCH make it possible to analyze
the effects of anticipating future climate impacts or policies on
optimal investments. Such forward-looking behaviour might differ
from short-sighted political reality and should be interpreted as
normative. Nonetheless, within the context of second-best climate
policies, the role of foresight has received little attention. Bosetti et al.
(2008) ﬁnd that developing countries' incentives to increase emis-
sions because of international leakage are more than counterbalanced
by the anticipation of an eventual climate policy, even when such a
policy is uncertain. This paper extends their analysis by focusing on
optimal investment strategies in technology and innovation for fast-
growing countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 analyzes the
implications of immediate versus delayed participation in an inter-
national climate agreement. Section 3 focuses on the investment
decisions about technology adoption and innovation, with a special
focus on policy anticipation in developing countries. Section 4
discusses the role of an international permit market in providing
adequate participation incentives. Section 5 concludes the paper by
summarizing our main results.2. International climate policies: immediate versus delayed
participation
Our analysis starts by looking at international climate policies
consistent with the long-term goal of stabilizing atmospheric
concentrations. We use the integrated assessment model WITCH2 to
investigate the economic and investment implications of climate
policy, assuming either immediate or fragmented participation. A
model description can be found in the Appendix.
WITCH is a hybrid energy–economy-model designed for the
economic analysis of climate change policy. A number of modeling
features are worth mentioning here, since they are important for the
analysis and results presented in this article. WITCH is a forward-
looking model that optimizes over a discounted stream of future
investment and consumption decisions; thus, it features perfect
foresight and has the ability to anticipate future shocks and policies
and incorporate them in current decisions. It is global, with 12
representative macro-regions that interact in a game-theoretic set up,
so that their investment decisions are taken strategically with respect2 See www.feem-web.it/witch for model description and related papers.
Fig. 1. Energy-related CO2 emissions in the BAU and the stabilization scenarios for the
WITCH model.
Table 1
Global macro-economic costs of climate stabilization policies (GWP losses with respect
to Business-as-Usual, annualized at 5% discount rate).
RF target (W/m2) Immediate Myopic Myopic penalty (USD trillions)
2.6 Infeasible Infeasible –
3.7 1.26% 2.53% 25
3.7 OT 1.11% 1.50% 8
4.5 0.06% 0.10% 0.2
S146 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S144–S151to other regions' choices. In addition, it incorporates technological
evolution by both diffusion and innovation processes, each character-
ized by international spillovers. Overall, the model is well suited for
investigating the role of various countries' economic incentives to
either join or free ride on climate coalitions, as well as for pinning
down future inter-temporal effects of climate policies.
The scenario design is coordinated with the Energy Modeling
Forum 22 comparison exercise (Clarke et al., forthcomimg). It moves
along two main dimensions (the stringency of the overall target and
the timing of participation of different world regions), but a third
dimension is speciﬁcally analyzed in this paper: the level of foresight
of regions prior to their commitment. In summary, we focus on the
following issues.
• Long-term stabilization targets: in line with the EMF prescription we
evaluate four targets, namely the stabilization of greenhouse gases'
radiative forcing by 2100 at 2.6, 3.7, 3.7 OT (with overshooting), and
4.5 W/m2.3
• Rate of international participation: two cases are considered in this
paper. The ﬁrst is with IMMEDIATE participation, modeled by a
uniform carbon tax starting in 2015. The second one is with MYOPIC
delayed participation of developing countries: BRICs join in 2030
and the others in 2050, with a carbon tax starting at the OECD initial
values and linearly converging to the OECD one in 20 years.
• Policy anticipation. On the foresight of non-participating countries
one possible extreme is to assumemyopic behaviour by ﬁxing all the
investment variables of late participants to their business-as-usual
values obtaining before they join the climate coalition. Scenarios
following this assumption, which underlies all the papers in the EMF
22 exercise, imply that developing countries are not allowed to
foresee the eventual climate policy, which is then received as a
shock. In reality, prior to their engagement countries are likely to
partly anticipate the policy and start to choose their technology
portfolio accordingly. Hence, we complete our analysis by dropping
the myopic assumption and analyzing the effects of policy anticipa-
tion on innovation and technology diffusion. We call this delayed
scenario FORESIGHT.
While the ﬁrst two themes are common to the whole EMF 22
comparison exercise, the analysis of policy anticipation and its
interplay with innovation and technology investments is very speciﬁc
to our analysis. It is the focus of the second part of the paper
(Section 3).
Fig. 1 reports the carbon emission trajectories produced byWITCH.
The graph quantiﬁes the challenge of stabilizing climate at safe levels.
The 3.7 scenario, which entails an average end-of-the-century3 WITCH uses the MAGICC model to determine carbon concentrations and combine
radiative forcing from Kyoto gases. The non-CO2 greenhouse gases' baselines and
abatement costs ﬁgures are taken from EPA, IIASA and EMF21. See the Appendix for
details.warming of 2.5 °C, requires that emissions are already signiﬁcantly
reduced in 2020, whereas the 3.7 OT and 4.5 allow for more gradual
mitigation. We will show that the choice of target has major
implications for the delayed participation scenarios, as expected.
The 2.6 W/m2 scenario is not shown as it is not feasible within our
modeling framework.4 It requires assuming the possibility of deploy-
ing negative emission technologies that are not considered in the
technical and economic assumptions behind the model. Also, since
our description of technology innovation requires upfront investment
costs in R&D whose payoff accrues only over the course of a few
decades, we ﬁnd it impossible to comply with the immediate drastic
emission reductions required by the low-forcing scenario.
Table 1 reports the macro-economic policy costs of the various
scenarios for the immediate and myopic cases. Costs increase non-
linearly with the stringency of the target; the looser 4.5 target has
small costs, whereas the 3.7 entails a gross world product (GWP) loss
somewhat above 1%, depending on the possibility to momentarily
overshoot the long-term radiative objective.
Table 1 also shows the global economic costs of the same policies
with countries' fragmented myopic participation. In the 3.7 case,
policy costs roughly double, to a 2.5% GWP loss; equivalently, the
penalty amounts to the very signiﬁcant ﬁgure of 25 trillion USD, in net
present value. This shows that a serious climate mitigation objective
requires a large coordinated effort that involves all major emitters
from the start. Otherwise, the global costs of achieving the target rise
very signiﬁcantly, with GDP losses as high as 4% in 2050.
Allowing for target overshooting has the potential to reduce this
penalty; global costs increase to 1.5%, and the delayed accession
economic penalty becomes 8 trillion USD. Though still sizeable,
overshooting manages to reduce it by two-thirds. Breaching the target
would generate higher transient temperatures and increase the risk of
missing the target if technology evolution did not develop as planned,
but this should be weighed against the signiﬁcant alleviation of the
economic penalty due to delayed participation. Finally, when a
relatively loose target such as the 4.5 W/m2 is endorsed, the increase
in policy costs would still be large in relative terms, but not in absolute
levels, given the initial low policy costs. In this case, the delayed
accession penalty would be on the order of 0.2 trillion USD.
The reason for the high delayed participation markup is that
developed regions are confronted with a much higher mitigation
effort at least until the middle of the century, given the bullish
predictions for emission growth in fast-growing economies such as
the BRICs and their long-lasting investments in carbon-polluting
infrastructure.
Fig. 2 shows the carbon prices for the 3.7 case. OECD countries
need much higher carbon prices to achieve the higher mitigation
effort, given the convexity of marginal abatement costs. Carbon prices
are signiﬁcantly above the ones resulting from immediate participa-
tion due to the foregone abatement opportunities in the developing
world. For example, in 2030, carbon prices reach 500 $/tCO2eq, as
opposed to less than 100 $/tCO2eq in the immediate participation
case.4 Speciﬁcally, the optimization algorithm can't ﬁnd a solution that matches the
emission constraints implied by the stabilization scenario.
Fig. 2. Price of carbon for the 3.7 W/m2 scenarios, immediate and myopic cases.
Fig. 4. Cost of a breakthrough technology, world average (3.7 W/m2 scenario).
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developing regions, by behaving myopically – i.e. by ignoring the
upcoming climate commitment – build the same signiﬁcant amount
of long-lasting carbon-intensive capital that they would have
accumulated in a climate unconcerned world, and forego the
innovation programs. The lock-in fossil investments are such that
even in 2100, at the time when all regions cooperate and share the
same shadow value of carbon, the markup carbon price of delayed
participation is still about 150 $/tCO2.
These results show that the delayed participation of developing
countries in the international effort to curb carbon emissions might
cast doubt on the feasibility of serious climate protection objectives,
though this would not necessarily be the case for less ambitious (and
effective) objectives. We now relax the assumption of myopic
behaviour to analyze the beneﬁts of policy anticipation for technology
adoption and innovation choices.3. Perfect foresight, innovation and delayed action in fast-growing
countries
The detrimental effects of delayed participation, both in terms of
policy costs and technology deployment – shown in the previous
section – are strictly linked to the dynamics of investments in
developing countries and the assumptions concerning policy antici-
pation. Indeed, a few decades of investments in fast-growing
economies without consideration for future climate changes are
sufﬁcient to lock in a stock of polluting capital that has long-lasting
consequences, and whose early retirement is extremely expensive. On
the other hand, developing countries are reluctant to modify their
short-term investment strategy, given their pressing development
needs. However, they also know that they might well join a global
cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions sometime in the future,
given the common goal to prevent excessive warming without
hampering economic growth and given the present rapid growth of
their GHG emissions.Fig. 3. Carbon captured and stored geologically (3.7 W/m2 scenario).One might therefore wonder to what extent policies that
materialize in the future are built into today's investment decisions.
Public and private investment decisions will likely incorporate some
expectations about future climate policy when capital with long-term
turnover is at stake, as is the case for power generation plants or
transport infrastructure. National policies might also be brought in
earlier. At the same time, policy implementation in some but not all
parts of the world might spur leakage effects, such as leakage in
developing regions due to lower international prices of fossil fuels.
Thus, the assumption– embedded in theprevious section's results–
that non-signatorycountriesmyopically follow their business-as-usual
investment paths when OECD countries decide to mitigate their own
GHG emissions may be erroneous. In this section, we investigate the
optimal investment strategies of fast-growing countries; that is, we
drop the assumption of myopic behaviour by relieving their invest-
ment and consumption choices from the BAU constraint and allowing
for foresight of future policies. We restrict our attention to the most
relevant case of a long-term radiative forcing target of 3.7 W/m2.
Prior to non-participating countries' commitment to a climate
target, their behaviour is affected by three different factors:
• Fossil fuel prices: the stringent climate target developed regions are
already committed to have an obvious effect on their consumption
of fossil fuels, which is reﬂected in their prices. Because of this
leakage effect, countries not yet involved in the climate agreement
have access to cheaper resources and have the incentive to increase
their emissions compared with the case in which there is no
agreement.Fig. 5. Decomposition of technological change for the breakthrough technology for the
US and China (3.7 W/m2 scenario). The bars show the (log) decrease of the cost of the
breakthorugh tehcnology in 2030 w.r.t. 2010 for the myopic, foresight and immediate
cases. The lower countoured part of each bar shows the contribution of innovation and
the upper the one by diffusion.
Fig. 6. Investments in nuclear power (left panel) and energy R&D (right panel) in China (3.7 W/m2 scenario).
S148 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S144–S151• Technological spillovers: OECD countries' commitment to a climate
policy fosters technical change in low-carbon technologies and
energy efﬁciency, thus also making them economically attractive in
developing countries via international spillovers of knowledge and
experience.
• Policy anticipation: when perfect foresight is accounted for,
countries ‘price-in’ the future carbon price in their investment
choices and, given the low turnover of energy capital and the lag
time in the innovation processes, adjust their portfolio of invest-
ments accordingly.
3.1. Deployment and innovation of low-carbon technologies
We start by investigating the implications of developing countries'
delayed participation and policy anticipation for the deployment of
carbon abatement technologies. Developing countries are believed to
host a substantial number of cheap mitigation options, which arise
from high energy intensity and capital replacement as a result of
rapidly expanding economies.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is considered to be an important
low-carbon technology, because it would allow the world to continue
to use affordable fossil fuels and at the same time reduce carbon
emissions. Therefore, it is expected to play an important role,
especially in countries that heavily rely on coal for generating
electricity, such as China and India. Fig. 3 shows that developing
countries' degree of policy anticipation has important repercussions
for the global deployment of CCS. A myopic strategy would reduce the
diffusion of CCS signiﬁcantly, imposing a 20-year delay that would be
made up only at the very end of the century. By contrast, if policy is
anticipated, CCS develops at rates similar to the ﬁrst-best scenario.
Technological innovation is also affected by the extent and
anticipation of international participation in a climate agreement.
Fig. 4 shows the cost of an advanced, representative carbon-free
technology in the non-electricity sector that is initially uncompetitiveFig. 7. Energy-related carbon emissions in China (3.7 W/m2 scenario).(at roughly 500 $/barrel of oil equivalent), but whose unit cost can be
decreased by both diffusion via learning by doing and by innovation
via dedicated R&D investments through a two-factor learning curve
(see Appendix for modeling details). The graph shows that at ﬁrst the
price of this new technology decreases faster in the myopic case; this
is due to the fact that in this case developed regions, facing a more
stringent early mitigation goal, invest more in the commercialization
of this technology. Given that they are initially the repository for most
of theworld's energy knowledge capital, a shift of themitigation effort
from developing to developed countries fosters higher initial
technological change.
Soon after, however, the cost of the technology in the two cases
switches, becoming and remaining cheaper in the immediate
participation scheme. The cost in the foresight case closely follows
the cost in the immediate one.
This behaviour is explained by the various forces that drive
technological evolution in the model. The breakthrough technology
can be made competitive by both deployment – modeled as
cumulative installed capacity – and innovation – modeled through a
dedicated knowledge stock. Both sources are subject to international
spillovers: the learning by doing part is assumed to spill over freely, as
it is determined by the global deployment of the technology. On the
other hand, the appropriation of the ‘learning by researching’
component requires local innovation investments to build up
absorption capacity and is lost under a myopic climate unconcerned
strategy.
Fig. 5 disentangles these two components for two representative
regions, the US and China.5 The picture shows that the decrease in the
breakthrough technology cost in the US would be marginally affected
by the rate of participation and foresight of developing countries. The
innovation component is roughly equal across the three scenarios,
given that the OECD regions host most of the energy knowledge
capital and would hardly beneﬁt from spillovers from developing
countries. The diffusion part is actually higher in the myopic scenario,
since in this case OECD regions face a more stringent mitigation target
and deploy more of the technology, as noted above.
Quite a different picture emerges for China. In the myopic case, the
innovation part is lost because no R&D investment in the break-
through technology is envisaged in this baseline-like scenario. This
prevents China from being able to lower the cost of the technology
through domestic learning by researching and through absorption of
developed countries' knowledge via international spillovers. There
would still be a diffusion component given the world spillovers, but it
would fall short of compensating for the lost innovation part. In the
end, by following a myopic strategy China would lose more than half
of the gains from the competitiveness of this important low-carbon
mitigation option.5 Given the Cobb–Douglas type production function of the two-factor learning curve
speciﬁcation, the logarithmic change of the cost of the technology is the average of the
diffusion and innovation parts, weighted by their learning rates.
Table 2
Global and regional macro-economic costs of climate stabilization policies, 3.7 W/m2
(GWP losses with respect to Business-as-Usual, annualized at 5% discount rate).
Region Immediate (%) Myopic (%) Foresight (%) Efﬁciency gains of foresight (%)
World 1.26 2.53 1.57 38
OECD 0.7 2.55 1.33 48
BRICs 2.1 3.14 2.45 22
Other 2.2 0.46 0.36 22
S149V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S144–S151On the other hand, a foresighted strategy that anticipates the
forthcoming policy would allow China to fully capture the potential
technological change, even slightly more so than in the immediate
participation case since, even with the foresight assumption, the
delayed participation of developing countries outside the BRICs
burdens China with a larger share of mitigation effort between 2030
and 2050.
These results point to geographical asymmetry in the impacts of
delayed participation and foresight on technological change. As far as
innovation is concerned, OECD countries would be only slightly
affected by the reluctance of developing regions to commit to carbon-
free investments. On the other hand, if emerging economies follow a
myopic scenario they may forego opportunities to innovate and proﬁt
from the OECD research effort.
3.2. Optimal investment strategies in emerging economies: the case of
China
The previous section has shown that the degree of policy
anticipation can have important effects on the way low-carbon
technologies are deployed and developed. The consequences are
global but have been shown to be particularly important for emerging
economies. In this sectionwe focus on the optimal energy investment
strategies that fast-growing countries should undertake under
different assumptions of foresight. We ask ourselves when and to
what extent a major emerging economy like China should deviate
from a baseline trajectory and endorse a climate-friendly investment
path.
Fig. 6 shows investments in China in nuclear power generation and
public energy R&D. Investments in nuclear power plants in the
foresight case depart from the baseline myopic case as early as 2015,
soon closing the gap with the immediate participation case. In 2020,
China invests 3 times as much in nuclear power plants as in the
baseline, from 5 to 15 billion USD. By 2030, the foresight and
immediate cases entail roughly 70 GW of nuclear power capacity, as
opposed to 30 GW in the myopic case. China has recently embarked
upon what seems to be an ambitious nuclear power generation plan,
with a 2020 declared target of 40 GW, and ofﬁcials are now claiming
that this objective may be exceeded by 50%, reaching 60 GW by 2020.6
The surge in public energy R&D investments, given the long
commercialization lag times and the smaller investment amounts,
starts even earlier, heading off baseline 15 years before. Interestingly,
R&D investments are higher in the foresight case than in the
immediate participation one, reaching 4 billion USD a year. The
reason for this is that, in the delayed foresight case, developing
countries outside BRICs do not join the coalition until 2050. Thus,
BRICs need to undertake more mitigation and invest more heavily and
earlier in R&D to build up a sufﬁcient knowledge stock to reduce
future mitigation stocks.
In recent years, China has signiﬁcantly increased its total R&D
spending7; it currently stands at 1.5% of GDP, or roughly 40 billion
USD, a level similar to that of manyWestern countries, but still behind
the world leading R&D investors such as the US and Japan. Never-
theless, China is moving to become a global technological and
scientiﬁc powerhouse. It has a stock of human resources for science
and technology second only to the US and has set a global R&D
spending target of 2.5% of GDP by 2020. Even assuming a conservative
estimate of 2% of energy R&D over total R&D, this would imply a ﬁgure
of roughly 4 billion USD, in line with the foresight scenario shown
above. Overall, one can say that observed and projected R&D
investments in green energy are consistent with the adoption of
domestic emission reduction obligations by China in 2030.6 http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssConsumerGoodsAndRetailNews/idUSL
0868760220080308.
7 We thank Dabo Guan for providing us with data and details.The investment patterns indicate that policy anticipation would
prompt early action in a major emerging economy such as China. Such
a deviation from baseline would materialize in earlier mitigation of
CO2 emissions. Fig. 7 reports fossil-related carbon emissions in China
for the various cases. The picture shows that carbon policy is
anticipated by roughly 10 years and that carbon emissions are
mitigated with respect to the baseline case when farsightedness is
accounted for. The abatement does not occur till 2020, but is quite
substantial afterwards, so that by the time China joins the climate
coalition in 2030, emissions are much closer to the case of immediate
participation than to the baseline.3.3. The economic beneﬁts of early action
In the previous section we showed that the optimal investment
strategy in developing countries is to anticipate the climate policy by
roughly 10 years (15 years for innovation). We now quantify the
economic implications of policy anticipation for both developing and
developed countries.
Table 2 compares the climate policy costs in the perfect foresight
case and in the other cases as well. Global costs with delayed
accessions but policy foresight are 1.57% of GWP, higher than the 1.2%
of immediate participation, but substantially lower than the 2.53% of
themyopic case. Equivalently, foresight decreases the global economic
penalty of delayed participation from 25 to 6 trillion USD, bringing it
below the case of radiative forcing overshooting analyzed in Section 2.
Table 2 also reports regional policy costs. Several things emerge.
The ﬁrst is that, in the delayed myopic scenario, policy costs increase
very signiﬁcantly for OECD countries, but also for BRICs. This is
because capital building in carbon-intensive technologies and the
delayed accession of other developing countries – among which are
big emitters such as South Africa and energy exporting regions –
require a radically higher carbon price when they start to participate.
As shown in Fig. 2, given the assumed harmonization of carbon prices
in a 20-year time span after having joined the climate coalition, BRICs
regions could expect a carbon price of zero to 2030 in the delayed case,
but a substantially higher one afterwards. Hence, they are worse off
compared with the immediate participation case. The other countries
also eventually face a higher carbon price, but this occurs far into the
century so that the net present value policy costs are lower in the
delayed myopic case.
Second, policy anticipation via perfect foresight beneﬁts all
regions, but especially OECD countries. Given that large emerging
economies reduce emissions similarly to the immediate participation
case as shown above, the OECD countries' extra mitigation job is
reduced substantially, and so are their costs. BRICs' smoothing of
abatement to earlier periods relieves them of the eventually higher
carbon prices, and accordingly eases the economic burden. Other
countries beneﬁt by both theirs and BRICs optimal investment choices,
further reducing their compliance costs.
Finally, Table 2 shows that some developing countries could be
badly hurt by climate policy. Carbon price harmonization in the
immediate participation case imposes higher costs on non-OECD
regions, given their higher energy expenditure as a share of GDP and
their reliance on carbon-intensive fuels (such as coal for big regions
Table 3
Financial transfers (+ outﬂow,− inﬂow) in an international carbon market (billions of
USD), 3.7 W/m2 scenario, for two allocation schemes.
Allocation
scheme
2020 2030
Myopic (BAU) Foresight Myopic (BAU) Foresight
OECD 94.2 23.6 197.2 147.8
BRICs −75.6 −17.1 −152.8 −65.6
Other −18.6 −6.5 −44.4 −82.2
S150 V. Bosetti et al. / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S144–S151like China and India8). In the delayed scenarios, the assumption that
carbon prices converge in 20 years is such that BRICs regions remain
the ones with higher climate policy costs, whereas the other
developing regions' costs drop visibly. Nonetheless, participation
incentives might be provided to alleviate part of this burden. The next
section tackles this issue, by looking at the role of an international
carbon market.4. The role of an international carbon market
One of the instruments with the potential to increase the
participation rate in global climate agreements is an international
carbon market. Such a scheme would increase policy efﬁciency by
equalizing marginal abatement costs, and could help developing
countries ﬁnance energy and carbon efﬁciency measures. Assuming a
perfect market with no transaction costs, the marginal price of carbon
would be unrelated to the initial allocation of carbon permits, but
regional gains or losses would be affected. Ideally, the allocation
scheme would provide sufﬁcient participation incentives to develop-
ing countries, without requiring excessively large transfers from
developed regions.
One possibility is to allow developing countries to trade emission
reductions below their baseline, as away to provide economic support
for the transition to a low-carbon society. However, the choice of
baseline is not an obvious one, since developing countries, especially
the fast-growing ones with large investment possibilities, might
incorporate energy- and carbon efﬁciency-enhancing measures into
their baseline anyway, as a way to prepare for a low-carbon and
energy-independent economy.
We tackle this issue by carrying forward the scenarios analysis
presented in the previous sections. We simulate a perfect interna-
tional carbon market starting in 2015 and consider two cases. In the
ﬁrst one, non-signatory countries are allocated an initial endowment
equal to their emissions in the myopic (which equals the baseline)
scenario. In the second one, the initial endowment corresponds to
emissions in the foresight case. For example, before joining in 2030,
China would get an allocation equal to the ones shown in Fig. 7 for the
two delayed scenarios.
The myopic allocation thus rewards any emission reduction with
respect to a “never climate concerned baseline”; by contrast, the
foresight allocation assumes that emerging economies would incor-
porate future (post-2030) climate policy in their actions anyway, and
raises the bar by allowing carbon trading below the lower emission
trajectory of a “future climate concerned baseline”. Given the
differences in emission pathways across these two cases (reported
in previous sections), we expect different carbon trading across the
two schemes.8 One might ask whether this is related to the modeling choice of market exchange
rates versus PPP, which leads to an initially higher energy intensity of the economy.
Although developing countries are probably more efﬁcient than predicted by MER,
especially on the consumption side, the MER approach reﬂects the fact that emerging
economies such as China have substantially higher fractions of their emission from
industry than from households compared with developed regions. Many of the
manufactured products are also traded internationally. Over time, MER's higher energy
intensity improvements over PPP ensure convergence.Indeed, in the myopic allocation the quantity of carbon traded is
roughly twice that in the perfect foresight one; the average between
2015 and 2030 is 5.1 GtCO2eq/year in the ﬁrst case, and 2.56 GtCO2eq/
year in the second. This ﬁgure should be compared to the total global
abatement effort that the world undertakes, which averages 11 GtCO2-
eq/year during the same period. That is, in the myopic case, 1/2 of the
total abatement is achieved via international carbon transfers,
whereas in the perfect foresight case that ratio is about 1/3.
The regional distribution of carbon trading also changes; in the
myopic case, 80% of OECD carbon purchases come from BRICs and 20%
from other developing countries. In the foresight case, the shares are
60% and 40%. The reason is that BRICs' emission reduction due to
policy anticipation in early periods is higher than other developing
countries', since the former are expected to take on climate policy
obligations earlier than the latter.
The resulting ﬁnancial transfers associated with these two possible
implementations of a carbon tradingmarket are reported in Table 3. In
2020, OECD countries transfer up to 94 billion USD to developing
countries in the myopic case, instead of 23 billion in the perfect
foresight case. These ﬁgures increase to almost 200 and 150 billion
respectively in 2030, due to more trading and higher carbon prices.
These numbers show that carbon trading can entail quite
signiﬁcant ﬁnancial transfers, especially in the myopic case, where
they reach 0.4% of OECD GDP in 2030. Our results also show that
transfers can be reduced by adopting an allocation scheme in which
developing countries' anticipation of future climate policy measures is
taken into account.5. Conclusions
This paper has looked at different participation schemes in a future
international climate agreement aimed at long-term climate stabiliza-
tion. Using a numerical energy–economy–climate model we have
shown that delayed participation of fast-growing countries in a global
climate treaty increases the cost of climate policy. The magnitude of
the penalty with respect to the ideal case of immediate participation
can be large, but depends on the stringency of the target and on the
possibility to temporarily breach the long-term climate objective.
Technology adoption and diffusion could also be jeopardized.
Starting from the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon
be) committed to reducing their own GHG emissions, we have
analyzed the best short-term investment strategies for developing
countries, especially for fast-growing countries such as BRIC. Our
results indicate that the optimal investment behaviour for emerging
economies is to anticipate climate policies by roughly 10 years, and
incorporate future carbon prices into short-term energy investment
decisions (both in the deployment of low-carbon technologies and for
innovation via R&D). A speciﬁc investigation of the actual and
projected trends in green innovation and low-carbon technologies
in China has revealed an investment pattern compatible with the
adoption of an emission mitigation policy by 2030.
Policy foresight appears to have the potential to signiﬁcantly ease
themark up of delayed participation. The paper also evaluated the role
of an international carbon market, and we suggest that allocation
schemes equal to or below baseline can provide developing countries
with participation incentives. In particular, recognizing emission
reductions below fast-growing economies' optimal policy foresight
strategy could encourage their accessionwithout implying excessively
large ﬁnancial transfers from developed countries.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associatedwith this article can be found in the
online version at doi: 10.1016/j.eneco.2009.06.011.
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